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Abstract 
This research investigates if the stringent 2020 and 2050 overarching CO2 mitigation objectives set out 
by the European Union dominate its 2010 to 2020 targets specific to the transportation arena, specifi-
cally its biofuel penetration objectives and gram CO 2 per kilometre emission caps. Using a dynamic re-
cursive general equilibrium model, IMACLIM-R, we demonstrate that these overarching targets do not 
dominate the interim transportation targets when the carbon policy triggering compliance with the mit-
igation objectives boils down to the theoretical least-cost option of uniform carbon pricing. Ground 
transportation is confirmed as quite insensitive to high carbon prices, even when such prices are ap-
plied over a long term. It is tempting to conclude that pursuing the mitigatio n objectives specific to 
transportation will impose unnecessary costs. However, because of the second best conditions prevail-
ing in actual economies, and of the risk of lock-in in carbon intensive trajectories, we conclude with the 
urgent need for some ambitious transport-specific policy design research agenda. 
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EU climate policy; EU transportation policy. 
 2 
Acknowledgments 
The authors gratefully acknowledge funding by the European Commission under the TranSust.Scan Pro-
ject. A. Vogt-Schilb, CIRED, provided useful comments on a preliminary version and precious support at 
the time of revision. Two anonymous reviewers significantly helped to improve the paper through their 
remarks and suggestions. The final document is the sole responsibility of the authors.  
Introduction 
The European Union developed two important and related strategies concerning transportation and 
sustainability in 2001. The first, the White Paper on Transport, investigated the trends in transport for 
the coming decade and proposed a number of policy packages (CEC, 2001a). The second, the Sustaina-
ble Development Strategy (SDS), articulated, for the first time, an integrated EU policy on sustainability 
(CEC, 2001b). Recent reviews of both documents reaffirmed and extended the commitments o f Europe-
an policymakers in these areas. The White Paper on Transport was central to European policymaking in 
this area for the period up to 2010 and received considerable attention from policymakers and re-
searchers alike. It has recently been replaced by a new strategy for the period up to 2020 (CEC, 2011a). 
However, relatively little academic focus has centred on the potential impacts of the SDS on transporta-
tion trends in the European Union. Its overriding environmental objective is to cap the increase in  glob-
al temperature rise to 2°C above pre-industrial levels by the end of this century. In order to achieve this 
goal, the European Union (EU) has committed itself to stringent interim targets in carbon dioxide (CO 2) 
emissions reductions by 2020 and 2050 respectively. The target is to reduce EU emissions by 20% com-
pared to 1990 levels in the absence of any international agreement by 2020 and by 60 to 80% by 2050 
(CEU, 2007). This 2050 target was subsequently raised to an 80 to 95% reduction objective in lat e 2009 
through a European Council stated objective within the context of a broader international agreement 
(DGE, 2011). More recently, the European Commission adopted its “Energy Roadmap 2050” as a basis 
for developing a long-term European energy use framework that also enshrines the 80-95% target (CEC, 
2011b). It is clear that the pursuit and achievement of these long term targets will, almost by necessity, 
impact on future trends in European transportation. 
In this paper, we investigate the impact of these overarching carbon constraints on the more focused 
short-term transportation objectives outlined in the SDS. To do this, we project the state and trends of 
European transportation up to 2050 in a business-as-usual or reference scenario, and compare it to an 
ambitious carbon-pricing scenario that proxies for the 2020 and 2050 emissions targets, at least at their 
pre-2009 levels.1 The reference and carbon-constrained scenarios are projections of the global dynamic 
recursive computable general equilibrium model IMACLIM-R. The model has specifically been devel-
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oped by CIRED to guarantee a full consistency between macroeconomic and energy balances. Our pur-
pose is to develop the above scenarios with the aim of exploring whether reaching both the interim 
20% and the long-term 60%-80% reduction in CO2 emissions by 2020 and 2050 through standard carbon 
pricing necessarily ‘dominates’, i.e. implies compliance with, other targets specifically related to the 
transport sphere outlined in the SDS—and develop a better understanding as to why it does or does 
not. 
The outline of the paper is as follows: section 1 presents some key transportation trends in the Europe-
an Union as it stands, it also outlines some of the problems associated with transport, and investigates 
some of the key Europe-wide policy responses developed by policymakers. Section 2 briefly reviews the 
SDS, paying particular attention to its role in relation to transport. Section 3 presents an overview of 
the IMACLIM-R model and reports key assumptions and general results of the baseline and policy pro-
jections. Section 4 focuses on transport and tests the hypothesis outlined above. Finally, section 5 con-
cludes with some policy observations. 
I.  Transportation trends in the European Union 
The growth in demand for road transportation in Europe has been rapid in recent decades. European 
policymakers turned towards analyzing and mitigating the negative impacts of these trends with the 
publication of the first White Paper on transportation in 1992. But by 2001, the numbe r of cars in the 
EU had trebled over 1970 levels to almost 175 million and continued to grow by about 3 million cars a 
year at the turn of the century (CEC, 2001a). In tandem with this, personal mobility on the continent 
doubled (CEC, 2006) and increased by another 7% in the period up to 2008 (CEC, 2011c). As a result, 
between 1995 and 2004 road transportation grew by 19% for passenger cars and by 35% for freight 
movements (measured by passenger-kilometres and tonne-kilometres respectively), continuing a long 
seen trend. Only with the economic crisis, beginning in 2008, did these trends slow (CEC, 2011c). The 
impact on Europe’s oil consumption and emissions of greenhouse gases is significant. Transport ac-
counts for over 30% of final energy consumption in the EU. By 2006 the road transportation sector ac-
counted for 44% of total freight transport (tonne kilometres) and almost 85% of total passenger 
transport (passenger kilometres) (CEC, 2006). The White Paper Midterm Review (CEC, 2006) notes that 
the private car accounts for three-quarters of passenger transport while transport by bus and coach 
combined accounts for less than 10% (these latter modes have grown by a modest 5% over the last 
decade). As a result of such trends, private cars account for half of ener gy consumed by transport (EEA, 
2012). Emissions from domestic transport contributed 21% of all CO 2 emissions in Europe—one of the 
fastest-growing sectors; such emissions grew by 23% over the period 1990 to 2010.2 With road trans-
portation heavily dependent on oil (it accounted for 67% of final European demand for oil in 2006 and 
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by 2008, over 95% of energy use in road transportation was made up of gasoline and diesel (CEC, 
2011c)), it alone accounted for almost 85% of CO 2 emissions from transport in 2006 (CEC, 2006). These 
trends have not changed markedly in the interim despite the economic crisis since 2008. The y raised 
environmental concerns that, coupled with increased concerns about security of energy and institu-
tional changes within the EU, have moved transportation towards the centre of the European policy 
agenda over the last two decades.  
The European Commission has long recognised the economic costs of excessive growth in road 
transport demand (cf. e.g. CEC, 1992; CEC, 1993). It often results in congestion because of the public 
good nature of road space (Sterner, 2003). But the costs of road transport are not restricted to users of 
the infrastructure. Indeed, the external costs of road traffic congestion, 3 were projected to more than 
double from 0.5% of EU gross domestic product (GDP) in 2001 by the end of the decade (CEC, 2001a). 
The recently published White Paper (CEC, 2011a; CEC, 2011c) estimated that congestion costs would 
reach €200 billion per annum by 2050. The additional costs of road transportation also include acci-
dents, road damage externalities and environmental costs. The latter costs consist of regional environ-
mental effects (including barrier effects imposed by transportation infrastructure, 4 acidification and 
noise) and air pollution (with both local and global impacts). This point is especially relevant given the 
increase in transport-related greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions and previously stated broader Europe-
an commitments to the Kyoto Protocol and other initiatives to reduce GHG emissi ons, exemplified by 
programs such as the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme. Partly as a result of increasing emis-
sions from road transport sources (up by 30% since 1990; CEC, 2007), many countries are now strug-
gling to meet their commitments to comply with agreed Kyoto Protocol limits.5 
Consequently, the focus of European policymakers in the area of transportation has widened from a 
primarily economic analysis, as per the first White Paper of 1992 (CEC, 1992), to encompass the other 
two spheres of sustainability, namely the environmental and social areas. This has been mirrored in the 
development of the 2001 White Paper (CEC, 2001a). This strategy, covering the period up to 2010 (with 
an update in 2006 that extended analysis to 2020),6 outlined a number of key objectives for transporta-
tion in Europe such as providing high levels of mobility to people and businesses while protecting pas-
senger safety, energy security, sustainability and efficiency(CEC, 2006).  
While longer term objectives aimed at balancing these competing needs were referred to in the 2001 
White Paper, specific long-term policy outcomes were beyond its scope. Accordingly, in 2008, the 
Commission proposed a strategy for greening transportation. The subsequent White Paper, launched in 
2011 (CEC, 2011a), attempts to set out a roadmap for a single transportation area and recognises the 
need for analyses of longer term transportation trends and proposed goals over a time frame of 20 -40 
years (CEC, 2007). Specifically, it refers to the need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by at least 60% 
by 2050 with respect to 1990 levels. Without any action, it projects that CO2 emissions will be one third 
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higher by that time. Consequently, while the inter-relations between transport and other areas in the 
economic, environmental and social spheres were alluded to,  it is only with the most recent white pa-
per that they have begun to be analysed together. For a broader overview of European polic ymaker’s 
goals in regard to longer-term climate change objectives, we can continue to look towards the SDS 
(CEC, 2001b). 
II. The European Union Sustainable Development Strategy 
The initial move towards sustainability in policymaking was the foundation and reporting of the World 
Commission on Environment and Development—the ‘Brundtland Commission’—in 1987 (UN, 1987). Its 
definition of sustainability—development meeting the needs of the present without compromising the 
ability of future generations to meet their own needs—is the most frequently cited one. The 1992 Unit-
ed Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil followed. It 
adopted Agenda 21 (the Rio Declaration). By 2001, European leaders also moved to incorporate sus-
tainability into the policymaking lexicon. The European Council present ed A Sustainable Europe for a 
Better World: A European Strategy for Sustainable Development  (CEC, 2001b). First proposed by the 
European Commission, it was adopted as the Sustainable Development Strategy (SDS) in 2001.  
Initially a broad statement of intent recognising the relationship between long-term economic growth, 
social cohesion and environmental protection, the strategy was re-launched in 2006 and further re-
viewed in 2009 with specific targets updated and developed. 7 The renewed strategy aims to implement 
a coherent long-term strategy and places emphasis both on immediate problems and also on longer -
term objectives. The 2009 review focused on ‘mainstreaming’ sustainable development policies into 
European policymaking and reiterated the updated goals.  The review outlines an absolute target of a 
15-30% reduction over 1990 CO2 emission levels by 2020;8 this was subsequently articulated by the 
Commission as a commitment to reduce emissions by 20% by 2020 in the absence of an international 
agreement on climate change and 30% with one (CEC, 2008). It also defines the 2°C cap on temperature 
increases over the century compared to pre-industrial levels. The European Council subsequently trans-
lated this into an EU objective of 60% to 80% reduction over 1990 leve ls in 2050 (CEU, 2007). The over-
all transportation objective is identified as ensuring that transport systems meet society’s economic, 
social and environmental needs whilst minimising negative transport -related externalities in these are-
as. Transportation targets include decoupling economic growth and transport demand, reducing GHG 
emissions from transport, modal shift towards more efficient modes, and reducing CO 2 emission from 
new light duty vehicles. Initially set at 120 grams of CO2 per kilometre (gCO2/km) by 2012, the objective 
was redefined in 2009 (regulation No 443/2009) to be 130gCO2/km. The former target was postponed 
to 2015; an additional goal of 95gCO2/km by 2020 was stated.9 
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Despite the flexibility in target formulation and development shown in  the SDS process, neither it nor 
the various transport white papers explore how the achievement of the long -term climate change goal 
will impact on shorter-term transportation targets. While some targets have broad interpretations so as 
to be able to incorporate the impacts of the long-term targets, others are more specific. This juxtaposi-
tion between the short-term sub-targets in EU policy-making related to transportation and the long-
term climate change objectives develops into an interesting story for re searchers. This is especially true 
given that the EU proposes to embark on a process that will indirectly address these interactions more 
closely. The 2011 White Paper (CEC, 2011a) adopts some 40 initiatives for the next decade with the aim 
of building a competitive and efficient transport system while dramatically reducing Europe’s depend-
ence on imported energy and cutting transport carbon emissions 60% below their 1990 level by 2050. 
But little mention is made of the shorter-term implications of meeting these longer-term targets. We 
investigate this relationship and, in doing so, complement the recent White Paper by developing a poli-
cy scenario aimed at exploring the impact of achieving the ultimate climate change aims of both a 20% 
and a 60-80% reduction in CO2 emissions by 2020 and 2050 respectively on transport sub-targets. 
III.  Scenario Development 
The baseline and the policy scenario that allow us to test our research hypothesis are projections of the 
IMACLIM-R model; both the model and the scenario assumptions are outlined below. 
III.1. The IMACLIM-R Model 
IMACLIM-R is a hybrid recursive general equilibrium model of the world economy divided into 12 re-
gions and 12 sectors (Sassi et al., 2009). The model is solved in sequential yearly time steps. The base 
year of the model (2001) is built on the balanced Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) of the world economy 
developed by the Global Trade Analysis Programme (GTAP-6 database), modified to accommodate the 
2001 International Energy Agency (IEA) energy balances. This data treatment effort is done to base the 
IMACLIM-R model on a set of hybrid energy-economy matrixes where the production and consumption 
volumes of the energy sectors are expressed in genuine energy units (million tons-of-oil equivalent, 
MTOE). 
As a general equilibrium model, IMACLIM-R provides a consistent macroeconomic framework to assess 
the energy-economy relationships by means of clearing factor and goods markets. Rooted in its hybrid 
calibration, the modelling architecture specifically aims at an easy incorporation of technological infor-
mation coming from bottom-up models and experts’ judgements into the projected economic trajecto-
ries: physical variables that explicitly characterise equipment, infrastructure and technologies ( e.g. the 
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efficiency of cars, the intensity of production in transport measured in tonne-kilometres, etc.) allow 
rigorously modelling how final demand and technical systems are transformed by economic incentives . 
The economy is thus defined both in money-metric terms and in physical quantities, with the two di-
mensions linked by a price vector. This dual vision is designed to guarantee a realistic technical back-
ground to the projected economy or, conversely, a realistic economic background to any projected 
technical system.  
To fully exploit the potential of this dual representation requires abandoning the use of conventional 
aggregate production functions that, after Berndt and Wood (1975) and Jorgenson (1981), were admit-
ted to mimic the set of available aggregate production techniques and thus the technical constraints 
impinging on an economy. Indeed, it is arguably impossible to find mathematical functions flexible 
enough to encompass different scenarios of structural changes resulting from the interplay between 
consumption styles, technologies and localisation patterns (Hourcade, 1993), for small as well as for 
large departures from the reference equilibrium. In IMACLIM-R, the absence of formal production func-
tions is compensated for by a recursive structure that allows for a systematic  exchange of information 
between:  
 An annual static equilibrium module with Leontief production functions (fixed equipment stocks 
and intensities of intermediary inputs, especially labour and energy )—but flexible utilisation rates. 
Solving this equilibrium at some year t provides a snapshot of the economy: information about rela-
tive prices, output levels, physical flows and profit rates for each sector and allocation of invest-
ments among sectors. 
 Dynamic modules, including demography, capital dynamics and sector-specific reduced forms of 
technology-rich models, most of which assess the reactions of technical systems to the previous 
static equilibria. These reactions are then reintroduced into the static module in the form of updat-
ed input-output coefficients to calculate year t+1 equilibrium. 
Between two equilibria, technical choices are fully flexible for new capital only : input-output coeffi-
cients and labour productivity indexes are modified at the margin, to account for the fixed techniques 
embodied in existing equipment and resulting from past technical choices. This general ‘putty-clay’ as-
sumption is critical to representing the inertia in technical systems and the perverse effect of volatility 
in economic signals. 
IMACLIM-R thus generates economic trajectories by solving successive yearly static equilibria of the 
economy interlinked through dynamic modules. Within the static equilibrium, in each region, the de-
mand for each good is derived from household consumption, government consumption, investment and 
intermediate uses from the production sectors. Supply is derived from domestic production or imports, 
as all goods and services are traded on world markets. Domestic and international markets for all 
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goods—excluding labour—are cleared by a unique set of relative prices that depend on the demand and 
supply behaviours of representative agents. The calculation of this equilibrium determines relative 
prices, wages, labour, quantities of goods and services, and value flows.  
In this framework, the main exogenous drivers of economic growth are population and labour produc-
tivity dynamics. However, international trade, particularly that of energy commodities, and imperfect 
markets for both labour (wage curve) and capital (constrained capital flows, varying utilisati on rates of 
productive capacities) can significantly impact on economic growth.  
In the IMACLIM-R model transportation activities are typically modelled as complex technical systems 
constrained by the consistent general macroeconomic framework  (cf. Appendix): 
 First, the transportation demand described in the static equilibrium module allows for the repre-
sentation of stylised facts, such as rebound effects associated with energy efficiency improvement 
or the demand induction by infrastructure that impact both total mobility and the underlying modal 
breakdown. To that end, the mobility of households is defined as an aggregate of 4 imperfectly sub-
stitutable travelling modes (air travel, public terrestrial modes, personal cars and non -motorised 
modes). It is one of the elements of the utility function of the representative household of each re-
gion. In addition to their budget constraint, households are subject to a travelling -time constraint. 
Last but not least, a ‘travelling time efficiency’ (average distance co vered in an hour of time) factor 
for each mode is described as an increasing function of public investment in the infrastructure ded-
icated to this mode. As for productive sectors, transport consumption, an intermediate input, de-
pends on the crossing of specific input-output coefficients (reflecting each sector’s transportation 
intensity) and the level of activity in each economic sector.  
 Second, the transportation dynamic module allows for the altering of technical constraints that 
hinge on transportation demand formation in the static equilibrium: the module keeps track of and 
marginally modifies the fleet composition and energy efficiency of personal cars, the transport in-
tensity of economic activity and, last but not least, the particulars of infrastructu re policies.  
The total time dedicated by households to mobility evolves in tandem with total population.  The motor-
isation rate is a function of per capita disposable income, according to an income-elasticity that quad-
ratically declines as it increases, up to a 700 vehicles per 1000 inhabitants asymptote meant to translate 
a saturation effect.  
On the technology side,10 evolution of the mean energy intensity of the automobile fleet is related to 
final energy prices through a representation of households’ equ ipment choices among 5 representative 
car technologies: standard and efficient conventional cars, standard and efficient hybrid cars and elec-
tric cars. Each technology is characterised by a capital cost and an energy efficiency expressed in litres 
of gasoline equivalent (lge) per 100 kilometres. Table 1 sums up the technology characteristics for Eu-
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rope.11 Each year, car sales induced by the evolution of the equipment rate and retirement of the oldest 
vintage are split between the 5 technologies according to their lifecycle costs (LCC) over an undifferen-
tiated 15-year usage and for the current region-specific average annual mileages. The split is dictated 
by a multinomial logit function to account for heterogeneous preferences and the  diversity of car uses, 
based on a 13% private discount rate. The capital costs of each technology evolve according to a 10% 
learning curve,12 while the energy intensities are constant over time: the efficient versions of the con-
ventional and hybrid technologies amount to efficiency asymptotes at the projecting horizon (2050); 
the endogenous shifts of their rates of penetration allow covering a continuum of (average) fuel effi-
ciencies and g/km emissions for both technologies between the higher bound s defined by their stand-
ard versions and the lower bounds defined by their efficient versions.13 
 
Conventional, 
standard 
Conventional, 
efficient 
Hybrid, 
standard 
Hybrid, 
efficient 
Electric 
car 
2001 capital cost,  
thousand USD 
17.5 20 25 35 35 
Consumption,  
lge per 100km 
9.0 6.7 4.5 2.4 2.0 
On-road emissions, 
gCO2/km 
226 168 113 60 0 
Table 1. European car technologies parameters 
Various investment policies can be tested for their impact on average modal speeds. Throughout this 
paper and due to brevity concerns, however, we stick to the conservative assumption that the building 
of transportation infrastructure follows the evolution of modal mobility.  
Road and rail freight and public passenger transportation are aggregated in one productive s ector. The 
evolution of this sector’s energy input coefficients therefore accounts for both energy efficiency gains 
and shifts between road and rail modes. This evolution is triggered by final energy price variations, 
based on a compact reaction function calibrated on bottom-up information from the POLES energy sec-
tor model (Criqui, 2001). The evolution of the freight content of economic growth, which is represented 
by the transportation input-output coefficients of all the productive sectors in the economy, is an exog-
enous scenario variable in this paper. However, we note that it is indeed debatable how energy prices 
affect a firm’s choice of localisation and production management and these parameters are likely to 
play a central role in cost-effective mitigation policies (Crassous et al., 2006). 
Finally, fuels are produced by a petroleum products sector, undifferentiated between gasoline and die-
sel. Biofuels and coal-to-liquid (CTL) fuels progressively enter the fuel mix. Biofuel penetration follows a 
set of worldwide supply curves provided by the IEA (IEA, 2006, pp. 283 and 288) for bio -ethanol and 
bio-diesel production, that are transposed as functions of the production price of conventional fuels 
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augmented by the carbon tax differential (the difference between the carbon tax levied on convention-
al fuels and that levied on each biofuel).14 CTL penetration is based on a microeconomic representation 
of investment behaviour, taking into account the dynamics of oil prices and some constraint on growth 
also derived from IEA analysis (IEA, 2008).15 
III.2. The baseline or ‘reference’ (REF) scenario  
The baseline or ‘reference’ (REF) scenario depicts business -as-usual economic growth in the absence of 
any carbon constraint (Table 2). At the world level, it envisages a doubling of real per capita income 
between 2001 and 2050, and thus corresponds to the lower range of the SRES scenarios (Nakicenovic et 
al., 2000), between the A2 and the B2 markers (which multiply per capita income by 1.8 and 2.5 respec-
tively). Behind this aggregate picture, regional dynamics differ substantially as they are characterised 
by a partial catch up between industrialised and developing countries (cf. e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 
1991, 1992; Quah, 1996):16 
 Europe and the other industrialised countries (OIC) suffer from a demographic slowdown that is 
unequally compensated by sustained gains of labour productivity. Compared to OIC, Europe is as-
sumed to benefit from higher labour productivity improvements over the first three deca des (the 
catch-up hypothesis), which results into higher growth. 
 China and India have their extremely high current growth rates reduced, as ( i) their labour produc-
tivity improvements increase to a peak, ( ii) their demography stabilises, and ( iii) rapidly increasing 
energy prices hamper their relatively energy-intensive economic activity. 
 Fossil fuels exporters (FFE) suffer from both stabilising demographics and a relatively low gain in 
labour productivity, that are imperfectly compensated by the rents they extract from increasingly 
tense energy markets. 
 In the rest of the world (ROW), increases in labour productivity slowly take over the sheer impact of 
demographics as the latter effect slows down. 
 2001-15 2016-30 2030-50 2001-50 
Europe 2.6% 1.9% 0.9% 1.7% 
Other industrialised countries 2.3% 1.6% 1.5% 1.7% 
China and India 9.6% 3.5% 2.1% 4.5% 
Fossil fuels exporters  5.9% 2.7% 1.3% 2.9% 
Rest of the world 5.1% 3.3% 2.6% 3.4% 
Table 2. Average annual growth of real GDP, REF scenario 
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 2001-15 2016-30 2030-50 2001-50 
Europe 1.3% -0.1% -0.1% 0.3% 
Other industrialised countries 1.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.7% 
China and India 6.9% 1.5% 1.2% 2.8% 
Fossil fuels exporters  3.4% 1.0% 0.2% 1.3% 
Rest of the world 3.8% 2.1% 2.3% 2.7% 
Table 3. Average annual growth of CO2 emissions, REF scenario 
Turning to environmental performance, the comparison of Table 2 and Table 3 reveals a significant de-
coupling of growth and CO2 emissions. In the absence of carbon constraint this is mainly due to two 
major determinants: 
 First, the physical constraints that limit the evolution of fossil fuel supply lead to a general increase 
of fossil energy prices along the projection. The price of coal on international markets experiences 
a 73% increase between 2001 and 2050, and the price of natural gas increases by almost 160% over 
the same period. The price of oil displays the most dramatic increase (cf. Figure 4 below): starting 
from $29 per barrel (hereafter /bbl) in 2001,17 it peaks at a $175/bbl maximum in 2037, when the 
continuingly growing global demand comes closest to the ever slower developing global production 
capacity.18 After 2037 it gradually decreases, reaching $120/bbl in 2050, as energy-efficient tech-
nologies enter the markets and alternative liquid fuel production (mainly second generation biofu-
els and synthetic fuels from coal-to-liquid production) develops. This general increase in fossil fuel 
prices fosters both the penetration of carbon-free energy sources (renewable and nuclear) into the 
primary energy mix, and the diffusion of energy-efficient equipment, which reduce the energy in-
tensity of economic growth. Higher energy prices also induce structural changes in the econo mies 
in favour of the less energy-intensive activities. 
 Second, the general increase in wealth is endogenously associated with a dematerialisation of 
growth: as per capita income increases, economies move from a base of (energy-intensive) heavy 
industries to one in which services dominate. Dematerialisation is projected for the industrialised 
world, to a lesser extent for China and India, and in a subtly different way for fossil fuels exporters 
as well (a significant part of their dematerialisation occurs through the increasing rents they draw 
from energy markets). It is much weaker for the rest of the world due to the ‘mimetic development’ 
assumption backing the REF scenario: developing countries are assumed to pursue the same life-
style as industrialised countries as their per capita income rises: they increase the size of their 
homes and buy more home equipment, switch to personal cars as their dominant transportation 
mode, etc. —these development trends are explicitly modelled in IMACLIM-R. 
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For Europe, the resulting carbon emissions profile rises to a +19% (over its 1990 level) peak in 2020, 
then gradually decreases to reach +13% in 2050 (Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1. CO2 emissions in the REF scenario 
III.3. The ‘overarching carbon constraint’ scenario  
The ‘overarching carbon constraint’ (OCC) policy scenario departs from the REF scenario in that it en-
visages the implementation of carbon prices on a global scale from 2011 on, based on:  
 The central assumption that Europe aims at CO2 emissions both at least 20% below their 1990 level 
in 2020, and with a long term objective at the lower range of its 60 to 80% target. Compliance with 
these constraints is attained through the simplest instrument of a uniform pricing of carbon (a 
generalised carbon tax).  
 The complementary hypothesis that the world outside Europe follows the European lead by apply-
ing the European price signals downgraded by 20% for the OIC, and 80% for all other regions.  
With our focus on Europe and its transportation activities, the latter set of assumptions i s not essential 
to our demonstration. It is only proposed as a more plausible option than unilateral action by Europe, 
which would cause strong distortions on international markets given the levels of carbon prices implied 
by the constraints. 
Figure 2 plots one European emission path compatible with these objectives, and the emissions of the 4 
other world regions previously outlined implied by their crudely hypothesised ‘follower behaviour’. 19 
Global emissions reach a strikingly early 32,8 billion tonnes of CO2 (hereafter GtCO2) peak in 2012, then 
decrease down to 15,9 GtCO2 in 2050. European emissions, on which we focus, reach an even more 
early 2010 peak at 12% over their 1990 level; they then decrease to 22% below this level in 2020, and 
end up at 65% below this level in 2050. 
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Figure 2. CO2 emissions in the OCC scenario 
The price signals required to achieve the challenging European emission reduction objectives, together 
with their downgraded values prevailing in other regions of the world, are presented in Figure 3. The 
European trajectory can be divided in three characteristic periods:  
 Between 2011 and 2030 the price of carbon increases very fast (+27.2 year 2001 US dollars per 
tonne of CO2—hereafter $/tCO2—per year) to reach $272/tCO2 in 2020, then fast (+$11.6/tCO2 per 
year) to $388/tCO2in 2030. The particular shape of this signal is related to a  demanding 2020 re-
duction objective (corresponding to a 33% decrease from REF emissions) that has to circumvent 
the high inertia of capital stocks and the myopic behaviour of economic agents.  
 Between 2030 and 2040 the price of carbon slightly decreases, as the technical change induced by 
early and ambitious climate policies diffuses, developing some emission reduction potentials at 
lower costs. 
 After 2040, the looming stringent 2050 target requires additional reductions that are more expen-
sive and carbon prices again experience a fast increase (+$10.3/tCO 2 per year). 
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Figure 3. CO2 price trajectories in the OCC scenario20 
The emission reductions triggered by those prices are related to major changes in the European energy 
sector. They are obtained, on the demand side, through the rapid diffusion of very -low-emission 
equipment in the building, transportation (see below), and industrial sectors, that allow a 59% re duc-
tion in the primary energy intensity of European GDP between 2001 and 2050—while in 2020 the re-
duction is already of 19% compared to 2001. On the supply side, low -carbon and carbon-free energy 
technologies, such as renewables, third generation nuclear power, and carbon capture and storage 
spread widely to allow a 60% cut in the CO2 intensity of total primary energy supply between 2001 and 
2050—the cut is 35% in 2020 compared to 2001. 
 2001-15 2016-30 2030-50 2001-50 
Europe 2.4% 
(-0.2) 
1.8% 
(-0.1) 
1.1% 
(+0.1) 
1.6% 
(-0.0) 
Other industrialised countries 2.1% 
(-0.2) 
1.5% 
(-0.0) 
1.6% 
(+0.1) 
1.7% 
(-0.0) 
China and India 9.1% 
(-0.4) 
3.3% 
(-0.1) 
2.3% 
(+0.1) 
4.4% 
(-0.1) 
Fossil fuels exporters  4.8% 
(-1.0) 
2.6% 
(-0.1) 
1.7% 
(+0.4) 
2.8% 
(-0.1) 
Rest of the world 4.9% 
(-0.1) 
3.3% 
(-0.0) 
2.6% 
(-0.0) 
3.4% 
(-0.1) 
Table 4. Average annual growth of real GDP, OCC scenario 
In brackets: percentage point deviation from the REF scenario (cf. Table 2). 
The general macroeconomic consequences of such major mutations of the energy systems are not as 
dramatic as one might expect—although it must be kept in mind that a GDP growing 1.7% a year will be 
5% above one growing 1.6% a year after 50 years. They depend to some extent on the characteristics of 
each region, but, generally speaking, economies bear the brunt of the constraint in the shorter run 
(Table 4Erreur ! Source du renvoi introuvable.Erreur ! Source du renvoi introuvable.), when they are 
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hampered by the inertia of their energy systems; in the longer run, when the necessary adjustments 
have taken place, growth tends back towards its REF levels, and even overshoots it in some regions. The 
possibility of overshooting the baseline in such a modelling architecture as IMACLIM -R is linked to the 
imperfect foresight assumption it adopts for all economic agents. The REF scenario is characterised by 
huge tensions on the oil markets that are not well anticipated. The climate policy gives a strong signal 
towards decarbonisation early enough in the trajectory to induce additional technical change for energy 
efficient technologies that does not occur in the baseline because of the lack of an early enough antici-
pation of the future tensions on oil markets. Economies thus can use more efficient technologies in the 
OCC scenario for a cost lower than in the REF scenario. It is indeed the case for Europe, which, after a 
loss of 0.2 points of annual growth between 2001 and 2015, decreasing to 0.1 point between 2016 and 
2030, experiences a gain of 0.2 points of annual growth in the 20 last years of projection. 
The impact on the other industrialised countries is smaller because of both a lower carbon price, and 
larger low-cost reduction potentials (esp. in the US). India and China are particularly hit, as they com-
bine the impacts of a carbon constraint—much downgraded but still significant for their developing 
carbon-intensive economies—with that of a diminution of international trade mechanically caused by a 
lower global growth. In a similar way but on different markets, foss il fuel exporters are strongly hit be-
fore 2030, as they see both their export volumes greatly reduced, and the consequently much lower 
tensions on the oil and gas markets decrease their rents (cf. the OCC vs. REF price of oil on international 
markets, Figure 4 below). 
 
Figure 4.  International price of oil in the REF and OCC scenarios21 
Still, the OCC scenario as it stands is somewhat conservative as it does not h ypothesise climate policy-
induced changes in lifestyles, location and urbanisation choices. It would be reasonable to assume that 
climate policies could be complemented by other public policies to induce such behavioural changes 
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(that are not very reactive to carbon prices) in a consistent way with the climate objective. The cost of 
stabilisation would probably be reduced with such a policy package (cf. e.g. Gusdorf et al., 2008). 
IV. European road transportation: from current trends to a carbon 
constrained European Union 
Let us now turn to the analysis of how the 2020 and 2050 OCCs impact the CO 2 emissions from ground 
transportation in Europe. To systematise this analysis we will successively report mobility, energy con-
sumption (backed by an analysis of the private car fleet), and CO 2 emissions for motorised ground 
transport. 
Aggregate motorised ground passenger mobility (i.e. the sum of private car, bus and rail passenger mo-
bility), measured in passenger-kilometres (pkm), appears quite resistant to the high carbon prices pre-
vailing in the OCC scenario (Figure 5, left-hand axis). Its impact is reminiscent of the GDP trends: a slight 
decrease is observed in the short- to medium-term, then some catching-up occurs beyond 2030, alt-
hough pkm stay below their REF value. Within this aggregate evolution the split between public and 
private transportation is also relatively unchanged. It only slightly evolves in the favour of the former 
modes, which end up above their REF level by 2050 as they naturally benefit from a much lower  carbon 
intensity per pkm. Notwithstanding, these results fundamentally confirm the oft -reported finding (see 
e.g. Espey, 1998, or Goodwin et al., 2004, for a survey), somewhat disturbing for policy -makers, that 
even high carbon prices have only a marginal impact on mobility in both quantitative and qualitative 
terms. 
 
Figure 5. European motorised ground mobility 
The evolution of freight tonnes-kilometres (tkm) follows a pattern similar to that of GDP, as freight 
transport highly depends on the overall level of activity. However, the impact of OCC on freight activity 
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ends up being stronger (-2.0% tkm in 2050 compared to REF) than its impact on GDP ( -1.1%). This re-
flects the impact of the stringent climate policy on the structure of the economy, which turns towards 
sectors that are less intensive in materials and transportation.  
Still, ground motorised mobility appears to be relatively insensitive to high carbon prices in both its 
passenger and freight dimensions. This result is echoed to some extent in the related energy consump-
tion. Measured in million tonnes of oil equivalent (MTOE), consumpt ion declines in the OCC scenario 
compared with their REF values (Figure 6), but the high carbon prices required by the OCC fail to curb 
down total energy consumption in absolute terms, and barely achieve its stabilisation. The split be-
tween fuels is also only marginally impacted; conventional fuels retain their two-third share of total 
energy: high carbon prices have the counter-intuitive effect of relaxing the tensions on international oil 
market, thus moderating the ultimate relative impact of OCC on gaso line prices. In the remaining third, 
however, the massive development of coal-to-liquid technologies projected in REF is blocked by high 
carbon prices, in the favour of biofuels, whose 2050 production is 120% higher than in the REF scenario. 
Although hybrid and electric cars begin to weigh in the total fleet at the end of the projected period 
(17.3% market share in 2050),22 the share of electricity remains low (6.5% in 2050) as this technology 
benefits from a high energy efficiency.  
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Figure 6. End-use energy consumption of ground transportation,  
REF (upper graph) vs OCC (lower graph) scenario 
To investigate these trends further, we focus on technical changes that alter the energy intensity and 
fuel mix in the transportation sector.  
As far as private cars are concerned, the 2001-2050 reduction in energy intensity (MTOE/pkm) shifts 
from 20% in the REF scenario to 34% in its OCC counterpart. These higher energy efficiency improve-
ments are due to market penetration of more efficient conventional cars and hy brid and electric cars 
(Figure 7). In the OCC scenario high carbon prices act as a signal and the fleet shares of less emitting 
technologies are boosted. Indeed, the share of non-conventional vehicles in 2030 increases from 10% in 
the REF scenario to 25% in the OCC scenario. We see further sustained growth in these technologies up 
to 2050 where they account for 17% of the on-road fleet in the REF scenario and 44% in the OCC sce-
nario.  
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Figure 7. Share of technologies in the private car fleet,  
REF (upper graph) vs OCC (lower graph) scenario 
While overall mobility is not affected by the carbon pricing strategy, the composition of the fleet (in 
terms of fuel choice and efficiency) thus undergoes some significant changes. Interestingly, we do see 
some catch-up in the REF scenario towards the second half of the time period. This trend occurs be-
cause of the increase in oil prices in the 2025-2040 period, which creates its own price signal to con-
sumers. However, the massive carbon pricing in the OCC scenario induces a stronger shift towards the 
cleaner technologies (whereas the increases in oil prices are much more moderate due to much lower 
tensions on oil markets) and prevents a comeback of less efficient technologies that occurs in the REF 
scenario as tensions on oil market are relaxed by the increasing production of synthetic fuels.  
Efficiency improvements are less important in the public transportation sector (freight and passengers) 
where the high carbon prices of OCC induce a modest 6.9% decrease in energy intensity compared to 
REF in 2050. This difference is mainly due to potentials for efficiency improvement, that are pictured by 
IMACLIM-R as high in the current automobile fleet (downsizing, material substitution, engine improve-
ments), but more conservatively for trucks and buses, reflecting consensual vs. more debated assump-
tions (IEA, 2009). 
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Turning to CO2 emissions, we find that ground transportation emissions do not follow the total emis-
sions trend constrained by the OCC scenario, at least under our hypothesis that this trend is achieved 
through the sole policy instrument of uniform carbon pricing. Reductions in ground transportation 
emissions under OCC indeed amount to 14% of REF emissions in 2020, 25% in 2050 (Figure 8). These 
figures are to be compared with the massive overall decreases of 34% and 69% achieved at those target 
dates, and ultimately tend to prove that transportation stands as an obstacle to stringent stabilisation 
objectives, at least when these objectives are pursued through carbon pric ing policies only. 
  
 
Figure 8. Tank-to-wheel CO2 emissions of ground transportation,  
REF (upper graph) vs OCC (lower graph) scenario 
Finally, we analyse how these results translate in terms of the specific transportation targets set by the 
EU. The level of detail of IMACLIM-R allows us to test in particular two policy areas of the transport 
arena that are addressed in the SDS. The first policy area relates to the penetration of biofuels in the 
market for transport fuel, with targets set for 2010 and 2020.23 The second relates to average emissions 
of CO2 per km from the new car fleet, for 2012, 2015 and 2020.24  
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Generally speaking, we find that all the outlined targets are missed in OCC as in REF, and missed by 
considerable distances (Table 5).  
Target Year Objective REF scenario OCC scenario 
Share of biofuels 
(EC 30/2003) 
2010 5.75% 0.19% 0.19% 
Share of biofuels 
(CEU, 2007) 
2020 10% 2.95% 4.02% 
LDV CO2 emis-
sions, bench-test 
vintage average 
(SDS target) 
2012 120 g/km 134 g/km 127 g/km 
LDV CO2 emis-
sions, bench-test 
vintage average 
(EC 443/2009) 
2015 120 g/kma 134 g/km 127 g/km 
LDV CO2 emis-
sions, bench-test 
vintage average 
2020 95 g/km 132 g/km 120 g/km 
a The target is more precisely defined as 130g/km on average for the total sales of each carmaker (with derogative 
provisions for very small producers), complemented by an extra 10g/km reduction from “additional measures”, cf. regula-
tion EC 443/2009. 
Table 5. Status of transport objectives under the two scenarios 
Bench-test vintage averages of the REF and OCC scenarios are systematically estimated 18% 
below the projected on-road vintage averages (cf. endnote 13) 
On biofuel penetration, in 2010 biofuel development spectacularly fails to meet its target, irrespective 
of the OCC, for the simple reason that the policy scenario does not diverge from the REF trajectory be-
fore 2011. in 2020 the OCC scenario starts to make a visible difference, as both the price incentive has 
developed, and time has elapsed allowing the development of production capacities. Still, the target is 
far from being reached: biofuels development still only makes up 40% of the target. 
The results on the average CO2 efficiency of new cars are more sensitive to the OCC scenario in the 
short term: as early as 2012 imposing the OCC cuts the 14 g/km compliance gap of REF in half. This 
higher responsiveness of fuel efficiency to pricing strategies is in part explained by the lesser inertia of 
mere market share shifts for already existing technologies (more efficient conventional vehicles and 
hybrid vehicles), compared to the development of industrial biofuel capacities. Still, by 2020 the 37 
g/km excess is only cut down to 25 g/km, and the 95 g/km is missed by 26%.  
These findings point once again at the low reactivity of the transportation sector to carbon policies that 
are exclusively price-based. Even in an ambitious climate scenario, in which policymakers resort to a 
stringent pricing of carbon with the aim of fulfilling an overarching reduction objective, there is no 
guarantee that interim or long term policy targets will be attained for the transportation sector. The 
biofuel and energy efficiency policy objectives are goals in themselves, which appear  to require addi-
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tional policy initiatives to be achieved. As a result, based on this evidence, we reject the hypothesis that 
the presence of such a long-range target will ‘dominate’ specific sectoral objectives.  
Conclusion 
Our research rejects the hypothesis that even stringent short- and long-term overarching CO2 mitiga-
tion targets dominate (i.e. necessary imply compliance with) short-run objectives in the transportation 
arena. More specifically, our simulations demonstrate that hitting mitigation targets  in the lower range 
of outlined overarching European objectives, i.e. constraining CO2 emissions 22% and 65% below their 
1990 level in 2020 and 2050 respectively, through the implementation of uniform economy -wide car-
bon prices, does not succeed in triggering significant changes in the transportation sector compatible 
with outlined 2010 to 2020 biofuels penetration and CO 2 intensity targets. Even in the longer term, car-
bon prices close to an impressive $500/tCO2 do not succeed in curbing CO2 emissions from ground 
transportation by more than a modest 25% decrease from their baseline trend . This is a significant step 
away from the 60% below 1990 levels objective of the 2011 White Paper on Transport.  
In policymaking terms it is tempting to jump to the conclusion that specific targets on transportation 
activities are superfluous, if anything unduly costly, as they suppose marginal prices higher than those 
triggering compliance to the overarching objectives. This would indeed echo the theoretical recom-
mendation that an overarching constraint as carbon mitigation should not be fragmented in sectoral 
targets or technology choices (biofuels) following some unavoidably flawed political process, but should 
rather be enforced by adjusting a uniform price signal that would ‘naturally’ select the cheaper abate-
ment opportunities, free of preconceptions.  
For at least two reasons this recommendation can be questioned in the case of carbon mitigation. First, 
it only prevails in first best economic conditions (perfect markets, perfect information, perfect anticipa-
tions), whereas addressing the market failures and imperfections of real economies may require ex-
tended policy packages. Guivarch and Hallegatte (2011) thus demonstrate that complementing uniform 
carbon pricing with policies targeting the development of infrastructures, which is otherwise barred by 
imperfect foresight and split incentives, significantly cuts down the costs of the more ambitious mitiga-
tion objectives. Similarly, the carbon-efficiency mandates questioned in our research might be a rele-
vant policy option to circumvent the ‘split incentive’ issues surrounding company cars . They could also 
be warranted to bridge the gap between the higher private discount rate governing car technology 
choices (13% in our modelling exercise) and the lower 3% to 5% discount rate commonly thought to 
apply to an aggregate ‘social welfare’ perspective.  Second, even if it were possible to prove that it is 
economically inefficient to pursue specific transportation objectives up to 205 0, it would not mean that 
there is no ground to do so for objectives beyond the OCC, both more stringent and more distant in 
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time: the resilience of CO2 emissions from ground transportation to carbon pricing hints at a lock -in of 
this activity in carbon intensive trajectories, that might compromise the ability of Europe to aim at tar-
gets in the higher range of their 2050 reduction objective, or even beyond, would e.g. some updated 
alarming information about climate sensitivity warrant it—Vogt-Schilb and al. (2012) demonstrate in-
deed how technical inertia can vouch for differentiated carbon prices. This in turn highlights the urgent 
need for some ambitious transport-specific policy design research agenda.  
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Appendix 
Transport specifications in IMACLIM-R 
This appendix details the transport specifications of the version of IMACLIM-R implemented during the 
FP7 European project TranSust.Scan, in 2009. More recent versions introduce further developments.  
Passenger mobility demand 
At each simulation year and in each of the 12 regions modelled  (for convenience we drop time and re-
gion subscripts in the following equations), households derive utility as a Stone-Geary function of con-
sumption Ci of n goods above basic-need levels iC , and a mobility service Sm: 
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 (A.1) 
The elasticities of utility to the consumptions and mobility service, i and m, are calibrated on 2001 
household budget data (m = 0.129). Sm is a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) composite of 
 the pkm travelled in the 4 represented modal aggregates, air transport, private car, public 
transport (except air) and non-motorised modes, above basic needs : 
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)1(1   , the elasticity of substitution between the pkm in the different modes beyond their basic 
needs, is set at 3.33 ( = 0.7) for all periods and regions. The bi parameters are equal to 4 for all periods 
and regions—this assumption amounts to fixing a unit of measurement to Sm and does not impact on 
modelling results. For lack of better hypotheses, in the REF and OCC runs reported in this paper the 
basic needs are nil for all modes except the private car, for which they are set at 70% of the observed 
2001 pkm, then progress each year at a rate 30% that of the pkm progression.  
Households maximise utility under 2 constraints. They are subject to the standard budget constraint: 
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 (A.3) 
with R the consumption budget; pi the consumer price of good i; pair and ppublic the consumer prices of 
one pkm of those modes (reflecting the cost structure of their productions); pfuel and pelec the consumer 
prices of one ton-of-oil equivalent (TOE) of liquid fuels or electricity; and  the average TOE 
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consumptions induced by one pkm by car—the fixed costs of car ownership do not enter this trade-off, 
but are considered in households investments, cf. infra. 
Simultaneously, households face a time-budget constraint, which acknowledges the stability of aggre-
gate (average) travel-time budget Tm across time and space, at 1.1 hours per person per day. This as-
sumption is supported by numerous studies with fairly close outcomes ranging from 50 minutes to 1.3 
hours per day (Zahavi and Talvitie, 1980; Bieber et al., 1994; Schaefer and Victor, 2000; Vilhelmson, 
1999). The pkm travelled with each mode add up to Tm following: 
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 (A.4) 
with vi the marginal speed of mode i (the speed of one additional pkm), which depends on the utilisa-
tion rate of Qi, an index of the pkm capacity of mode i, following: 
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The maximum speeds vi0 of the air, private car, public and soft modes are respectively set at 700, 80, 50 
and 5 km/h. The ai and i parameters are calibrated on the mobility and budget share data of 2001, and 
on the supplementary assumption that saturation (Di = Qi) drives the speed vi down to 5 km/h (for all i 
vi(1) = 5). However, in both our REF and OCC scenarios and for any mode i, Qi is assumed to evolve as 
Di, which amounts to considering constant speed for all modes.  
Freight mobility demand 
At each simulation year the (short run) cost structure of all productions is assumed  to be fixed, follow-
ing a Leontief production function. In particular, the intensity of all productions in each of three aggre-
gate freight transportation modes (air, water and terrestrial transport , which includes both road and 
rail modes because of data limitations) is measured by input-output coefficients, which define a linear 
dependence of current freight mobility to all current production volumes. The input-output coefficients 
implicitly capture the spatial organisation of the production processes and the constraints imposed on 
distribution by the distances to markets and the prevalence of just -in-time processes. In both the REF 
and OCC runs they are exogenously decreased over time (-0.55% a year up to 2040, linearly reduced to -
0.35% in 2050) to capture logistic improvements of the production and distribution processes.  
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Transportation technologies and energy efficiency 
Following Dargay et al. (2007), the motorisation rate of each region is elastic to per capita disposable 
income. The variable elasticity quadratically decreases as the motorisation rate increases, from 1.86 at 
0 vehicles per capita, to 0.00 at 0.700 vehicles per capita. The consecutive 0.700 vehicles per capita 
asymptote is derived from the current US equipment rate. 
The energy mix and efficiency of private vehicles, i.e. the and  coefficients of equation (A.3), 
result each year from households’ decisions on the purchase of n ew vehicles among 5 car technologies 
(cf. Table 1 section III.1 above). At each period and in each region, technology i captures a share i of 
the market defined by the increase of the motorisation rate and the replacement of all vintages above 
15 years. i is defined by a multinomial logit: 
  (A.6) 
with LCCi the life-cycle cost of technology i computed for the current regional mileage and 
fuel/electricity prices over a 15-year horizon considering a 13% discount rate (discussed in Vogt -Schilb 
et al., 2009);  the ‘homogeneity factor’, calibrated to maximise the match of the observed and mod-
elled average fleet efficiencies between 2001 and 2005 (in Europe  equals -22). The capital costs of 
each technology are subject to a 10% learning curve (cf. endnote 12). For the sole purpose of this curve, 
all car fleets are supposed to count 100 million vehicles at the starting year, except the  efficient hybrids 
(50 million vehicles) and the electric vehicles (10 million vehicles). These are computational artefacts 
that allow deriving capital costs trends in line with the available prospective works of authoritative bod-
ies as the IEA (cf. IEA 2006, IEA 2008). 
The energy efficiency of modes other than the private car is not represented through explicit vehicle 
technologies. It is rather implicitly captured through the evolution of the input -output coefficients 
measuring the intensity of each mode (water, air and terrestrial transport) in automotive fuels and 
electricity (where applicable): 
 The fuel intensity of terrestrial transport is elastic to fuel prices according to a -0.35 elasticity (con-
stant across regions and times). 
 The fuel intensity of air transportation benefits from exogenous energy efficiency improvements of 
0.7% a year. 
 The fuel intensity of water transportation remains constant at its 2001 calibration level.  
 The electricity intensity of terrestrial transport remains constant at its 2001 calibration level (the 
electricity intensities of the 2 other modes are nil and remain so) . 
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Biofuel supply curves 
Yearly biofuel supply potentials are interpolated from the 2010, 2030 and 2050 curves published by the 
IEA (IEA, 2006, pp. 283 and 288). For the sake of clarity, we only reproduce the supply potentials of the 
biofuel target years 2010 and 2020 (Figure A1, Figure A2). The potential MTOE contribution of biofuels 
to global fuel demand is determined by comparing the USD per lge production costs in ordinate of each 
curves with the international producer cost of conventional fuel production ; in case carbon pricing is in 
force this cost is adjusted to account for the carbon emission differential of the fuels —bio-ethanol and 
bio-diesel are assumed carbon contents 20% and 10% below that of the conventional gasoline -
equivalent. Each macro region is then assumed to consume the produced biofuels prorata its current 
conventional consumption. 
 
Figure A1. Global supply curve for ethanol biofuels 
 
Figure A2. Global supply curve for biodiesel 
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Coal-to-liquid substitute 
Beyond the exogenous threshold of 100 year-2001 dollars per barrel of oil, a coal-to-liquid (CTL) substi-
tute to automotive fuels is produced each year based on an imperfect anticipation of the gap between 
the supply and demand of conventional fuels, on a regional basis. On the supply side, CTL producers 
perfectly anticipate the increase of the regional conventional refining capacities, and have full infor-
mation on the global supply curves of biofuel production; however, they wrongly assume maintained 
utilisation rates of the refining capacities, together with unchanged international average production 
prices of the conventional fuels and a stable distribution among regions of biofuel production (to antic-
ipate regional biofuel supply). On the demand side, they project aggregate regional demand according 
to its observed one-year trend. If a shortage of supply results from the crossing of these anticipations, a 
matching CTL volume is produced.  
This volume is sold at a price that is not modelled as such: CTL fuels are not stand-alone goods but are 
part of the gasoline-equivalent good produced by the refined petroleum products sector. Based on a 
central 0.7 efficiency assumption (one MTOE of coal is necessary to produce 0.7 MTOE of coal-to-liquid 
fuel; this efficiency is quite higher than the 0.33 efficiency that can be inferred from current AIE energy 
balances, but it applies to later years of the projection period) , the volume of CTL production impacts 
on the cost structure of the refining sector through its direct coal costs, and through the higher other 
primary and secondary factor consumptions induced by the increase of the total gasoline -equivalent 
output of the sector, considering the prevailing factor intensities. In other words, CTL production is as-
sumed the same cost structure as conventional fuel production, except that coal  is substituted to oil as 
a primary input (on the basis of 1/0.7 = 1.43 MTOE per MTOE of output).  
Endnotes 
                                                                
1 We restricted our analysis to the less extreme pre-2009 levels for the simple reason that the -80% 
threshold is barred by some of the technical asymptotes built in the current version of IMACLIM -R—
which are meant to reflect the current state-of-the-art of bottom-up expertise on both intermediate 
and final energy consumptions. Clarke et al. (2009) provide a discussion of the reasons why extreme 
abatement targets cannot be achieved by models similar to IMACLIM-R (as the SGM model, which takes 
part to the study they report on). 
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2 Road Transport: Reducing CO2 emissions from vehicles, European Commission Climate Action: 
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/transport/vehicles/index_en.htm 
3 Congestion occurs because the motorist’s private marginal costs diverge from the cost he/she imposes 
on society. The externalities can manifest themselves as delays in business transactions, excess busi-
ness and private time lost to congestion, etc. 
4 For instance: severance impacts on ecosystems or communities arising from the construction of a mo-
torway. 
5 The treaty, signed by more than 165 countries, entered into force in February 2005. It commits the 
countries listed in its Annex 1 to an overall 5.2% reduction on 1990 levels  by 2008-2012, cf. 
http://unfccc.int/essential_background/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratif ication/items/2613.php (ac-
cessed December 2nd, 2011). The EU ratified the treaty in May 2001, committing itself to an 8% reduc-
tion over the period. 
6 In 2006 the EU published a mid-term review of the White Paper on European Transport Policy for 2010 
(CEC, 2006). As part of this review, Transport and Mobility in the Catholic University of Leuven devel-
oped scenarios to run its TREMOVE model on. This had two aims: firstly to assess the conformance of 
the transport implementation activities with the original White Paper over the period 2001-2005; sec-
ondly, to assess whether the objectives were still feasible given policy and trend developments. An 
analysis of these 60 objectives is beyond the scope of this research but interested readers are directed 
to Annex 1 of the 2001 White Paper on Transport (CEC, 2001a). 
7 A global dimension has also been added to the policymaking process with the adoption of the 2002 
strategy on establishing a global partnership in sustainable development (CEC, 2002): http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2002/com2002_0082en01.pdf  
8 This strengthened the commitment in the original SDS, outlined in relative terms only: to reduce at-
mospheric greenhouse gas emissions by an average of 1% of 1990 levels per year up to 2020. 
9 Cf. EC regulation 443/2009 at  http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:140:0001:0015:EN:PDF (accessed December 
13th, 2011). 
10 The following technology description is adapted from Vogt-Schilb et al. (2009). 
11 Vogt-Schilb et al. (2009) provide more detail on the calibration process, and the assumptions b acking 
the more debatable characteristics of the hybrid and electric technologies.  
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12 The ‘learning curve’ approach to technology improvements dates back to Arrow (1962). A 10% rate 
means that the capital cost of a technology decreases by 10% every time th e fleet of that technology 
doubles. An anonymous reviewer suggested that the learning rates of the hybrid and electric cars 
should be somehow correlated, because they share the same battery technology. Unfortunately, we 
could not confirm and implement such linkages within the timeframe of this publication; we will con-
sider this issue in future work. 
13 The higher bounds to energy and carbon efficiency of the conventional and hybrid technologies de-
fined by their efficient versions may appear high, but ( i) must be understood as fleet averages: more 
efficient cars do already exist, but for sizes, performances and equipments that cannot match the needs 
of all drivers, especially when it comes to long-distance trips (less efficient cars thus tend to drive more 
annual miles than more efficient ones, which impacts on average efficiency); ( ii) are the on-road values 
that are explicitly implemented in IMACLIM, notoriously higher than bench -test values. Throughout this 
research we systematically assess the corresponding bench-test values as 18% lower, based on an as-
sessment of the average bench-test emissions of the 2005 fleet by the Sustainable Mobility Project (cf. 
http://www.wbcsd.org/work-program/sector-projects/mobility.aspx). At last, it must be borne in mind 
that carbon intensities can be cut down by the penetration of biofuels.  
14 Following the IEA (IEA, 2004), net carbon emissions of bio -ethanol and bio-diesel consumptions are 
set at 20% and 10% those of the average conventional fuel.  
15 Rozenberg et al. (2010) provide more detail on biofuel and CTL modelling in IMACLIM-R. 
16 For the sake of brevity the results of the 12 regions of IMACLIM-R will systematically be grouped into 
5 regional aggregates. Although, the “Europe” region of IMACLIM-R extends to all geographical Europe, 
i.e. beyond the European Union strictly speaking, the size and economic characteristics (including 
transportation organization) of non-EU Europe relative to EU Europe are such that this can be over-
looked. 
17 All dollar figures are in year 2001 USD.  
18 Oil supply is endogenous in IMACLIM-R. Each region is endowed with 6 types of reserves differentiat-
ed by their extraction costs. The effective capacity of production in each  of these 6 reserves follows a 
Hubbert curve. It is exploited on a simple profitability criterion, based on a mark-up rate that increases 
with current output (Waisman et al., 2012). 
19 Because IMACLIM-R is a simulation model and not an optimisation one, the 2020 and 2050 con-
straints cannot be set as such. Rather, the European emission trajectory is obtained by a trial-and-error 
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approach that consists in adjusting 4 decadal slopes of increase of the carbon price in Europe. The ca. 
10% overshoot at both dates was willingly not refined as it happens to strengthen the argument of the 
paper.  
20 We do not model the moderate European Trading System prices from 2005 to 2010 because these do  
not concern transportation activities. Accounting for them could only reinforce our conclusions, by put-
ting a downward pressure on the post-2010 carbon prices necessary to the overarching commitments—
leading to even weaker impacts of compliance with the overarching targets on transportation activities . 
21 The IMACLIM-R model is not specifically calibrated to reproduce the recent economic cycles, namely 
the 2005 to 2008 boom and the ensuing crisis. This accounts for its not projecting oil prices consistent 
with observation over these years.  
22 The penetration of electric vehicles is substantially lower than the figures commonly found in recent 
studies (cf. e.g. IEA, 2009), for the reason that, contrary to these studies, OCC does not assume any tar-
geted incentive or support. 
23 This second target has only been formulated in 2007 (CEU, 2007), in a political context marked by a 
hot debate on the actual sustainability of biofuel production when due consideration is given to its im-
pacts on biodiversity, water consumption, land and hence food prices, etc. 
24 The initial SDS emission target for 2012 has since been postponed to 2015 (cf. EC regulation 443/2009 
at   
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:140:0001:0015:EN:PDF , accessed 
December 13th, 2011).  
